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Changing patterns of public research funding  
in France 
Jean Thèves, Benedetto Lepori and Philippe Larédo 
In this paper, we critically assess the specificity of the French research system and of its funding mode, 
which is accepted in most of the literature on the subject. We show that this interpretation is largely a 
result of the use of categories for the analysis of public funding that are not really suited to the French 
case. We thus develop two new categories: joint laboratories as a distinct organisational structure 
between public research organisations and universities; and human resources funding as a description 
of the specific allocation mode of CNRS (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) to the joint 
laboratories, which we consider as more similar to project funding than to core funding. We then show 
that the French system has changed fundamentally in the last two decades, moving towards a system 
much nearer to other European countries than normally assumed, albeit following a distinct 
evolutionary trajectory based on the gradual restructuring of existing instruments. In methodological 
terms, this underlines the importance of adapting the categories for the analysis of funding systems to 
the specificities of each national context. 
N THE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, the 
French system of research funding has been 
mostly considered as a very specific case, which 
does not easily fit into international classifications 
(Senker et al, 1999; Senker, 2000). These specifici-
ties include: the centralistic decision-making struc-
ture concerning research (for example, through the 
technological programmes: see Papon and Barré, 
1993; Larédo and de Laat, 1998) and higher educa-
tion, with limited autonomy and decision-making 
power of universities (Musselin, 2001); the import-
ance of its public research organisations (PROs, with 
CNRS (the national scientific research centre) as the 
largest European research institution), with rela-
tively weak universities and the very specific ar-
rangement of the joint laboratories between PROs 
and universities; and the limited role played by  
project funding and its concentration on the support 
of industrial research, with the lack of an agency 
funding academic research (Gilpin, 1970; Chesnais, 
1993; Papon, 1998; OECD, 2004). 
Some studies have tried to highlight the recent 
evolutions (Larédo and Mustar, 2001; Millar and 
Senker, 2000) and the changes that might occur (Fu-
tuRIS, 2005). These analyses underline the limited 
amount of public money dedicated to project fund-
ing and channelled through agencies and lead us to 
consider the French research system as hybrid 
(OECD, 2003) or even idiosyncratic (Senker et al, 
1999). 
In this paper, we aim to discuss in more depth the 
extent of these specificities by using data on re-
search funding, including the recent data on public 
project funding produced in the PRIME project on 
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this subject (Lepori et al, 2007, this issue). Our  
hypothesis is that the perception of a specific French 
system and of its stability over time is largely driven 
by the continued application of traditional classifica-
tion schemes for research and research funding, 
which no longer fit the specific French context. This 
is the case for the separation between the higher-
education and public research sectors introduced by 
the Frascati Manual (OECD, 2002) and by the dis-
tinction between general funding and project fund-
ing adopted in most studies on funding systems 
(Millar and Senker, 2000; Lepori et al, 2008). What 
we show is that challenging this classification could 
be seminal to rethinking the perception of the so-
called ‘French specificities’. 
With this aim, we will define categories that re-
flect the French situation better and, in particular, 
the diffusion of the organisational form of the joint 
laboratories between CNRS and universities on one 
side, and the specificities of allocation mechanisms 
to these laboratories on the other side; this will lead 
us to a different interpretation of the French case 
and, especially, show a much greater change over 
time than usually assumed. 
In this analysis, we first envisage the traditional 
view of public research funding in France, including 
a more detailed discussion of project funding data. 
This analysis will enable us to grasp the specificity 
of the French system in terms of importance (with a 
lower share of public project funding than all other 
European countries analysed), beneficiaries (with 
the overwhelming role of the private sector as main  
recipient of project funding) and organisation with 
the quasi-absence of an intermediary layer (van der 
Meulen and Rip, 1998; Guston, 1996; Braun, 1993). 
Such an analysis is based on a clear cut delineation 
between public research organisations and higher 
education institutions as independent performers 
(OECD, 2002), while project-based allocation of re-
sources is done only by the government or by spe-
cialised agencies. 
Secondly, we introduce the main changes that have 
emerged during the last three decades, namely the 
generalisation of the joint laboratories as the main 
form of research organisation in France and the 
change in the allocation of resources by CNRS, 
which for many aspects has become more similar to 
what would be seen as a project-based allocation of 
resources than to ‘regular’ core funding. Both phe-
nomena lead to a very different description of the 
French situation, which now displays features closer 
to other European countries (Thèves et al, 2006). 
Finally, we discuss the very recent creation of a 
large intermediary agency (Agence Nationale pour la 
Recherche, ANR), which could lead in the next few 
years to the transition to an organisation form of 
public research funding more similar to other Euro-
pean countries. We finish with a short section pro-
viding some conclusions and methodological 
lessons. 
Public funding of research in France 
Comparative work on European countries has 
shown that, despite national specificities, allocation 
mechanisms can be broadly divided into two main 
streams, namely, general allocations to research or-
ganisations (public research laboratories or higher-
education institutions) and project funds attributed 
normally by external agencies, such as research 
councils, and ministries, to individual researchers 
for a limited period of time (Millar and Senker, 
2000; Lepori, 2006). In this section, we adopt these 
categories to draw an overall picture of French re-
search funding. 
Overall volume and role of different departments 
In 2002, public funding for research in France ac-
counted for €15.5 billion, which represented 43 % of 
total research funding (OECD, 2005). This share has 
been slowly decreasing over the last 20 years be-
cause of the increase in private-sector research and 
the decrease in defence R&D. 
Public funding comes mainly from three minis-
tries (see Figure 1). The Ministry in charge of higher 
education1 deals with most higher-education institu-
tions. Its main contribution is the salaries of univer-
sity staff and, in particular, academic staff, or 
enseignants-chercheurs, who are supposed by status 
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to devote half of their working time to research. This 
amount is a convention since there are no recent  
surveys on the use of time by academic staff in 
France (OECD, 2000). 
The Ministry in charge of research2 has three 
main functions. First, it acts as the co-ordinator of all 
civil funding of research, negotiating with the 
Treasury the overall amount and allocation of civil 
public expenditure on R&D (Budget Civil de la Re-
cherche et du Développement, BCRD) and thus pre-
senting every year to Parliament a consolidated 
budget for civil R&D (the so-called yellow book for 
R&D). Its own budgetary allocation covers the core 
funding of PROs, and specific funds for supporting 
basic and technological research. 
The third major source of funding comes from the 
Ministry of Defence, whose activities cover the 
whole spectrum with its own research facilities, 
dedicated PROs (for instance, ONERA for aeronau-
tics research) and project-based R&D, mostly 
awarded to the private sector. One specific feature is 
that it also funds R&D in “dual” PRO, especially for 
nuclear (CEA) and space (CNES) research. 
Moreover, several departments have developed 
both specific instruments for funding of dedicated 
bodies (such as industry with technical centres, and 
agriculture with its own higher-education institutions 
and support to agro-food technical centres) and for 
funding project-based research (health with clinical 
research, environment and so on). Of the total 
amount of public money for research in 2002, 58% 
was under the responsibility of the Ministry in 
charge of research and the rest was shared equally 
between higher education and defence. 
Main recipients 
In most international studies (Gilpin, 1970; Chesnais, 
1993), France is characterised by two main attributes 
concerning its public R&D expenditure: strong  
public transfer to industry associated with its long 
tradition of “large programmes” (Larédo and de 
Laat, 1998), and weak university research compen-
sated for by the strong role of dedicated research in-
stitutions (see Figure 2). 
Nearly one-fifth of the public funds for R&D 
went to the private sector in 2002. This represented 
11% of total internal expenditure by the private  
sector: this figure was above 18% ten years before. 
Both the overall amount and its diminution over 
time is linked with military research, the Ministry of 
Defence representing over 75% of the total. The 
main civil sources are from the aeronautics and 
space programmes. 
Figure 2 also confirms the low level of university 
research funding, standing at 25%. Furthermore, out 
of the €3.8 billion devoted to higher-education insti-
tutions, over 85% is for salaries. The same figure 
highlights the dominant role of the state sector. 
CNRS is the largest research institution in Europe, 
among the others INSERM for health and INRA for 
agriculture are the largest. The 1982 law on research, 
while granting them a special status (Etablissement 
Public à caractère Scientifique et Technique, EPST), 
has transformed their staff into civil servants. 
This change did not apply to the pre-existing insti-
tutions that focused on development and had been 
granted the status of Etablissement Public à carac-
tère Industriel et Commercial (EPIC), among them 
CEA for nuclear research (but also with important 
departments in microelectronics, materials and ge-
nomic research), IFREMER for ocean research and 
fisheries and ONERA for aeronautics research 
(Théry and Barré, 2001). The main difference is that 
private rules apply both for the management of hu-
man resources and for finance (including borrowing 
Research 
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Figure 1.  Main sources of public funding in France, 2002 
Source:  Thèves et al (2006) 
State
49%
HE
25%
Private
20%
Abroad
5%
PNP 
1% 
Figure 2.  Main recipients of public funding in France, 2002 
Source:  Thèves et al  (2006) 
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and creation of subsidiaries). Table 1 compares the 
staff at the main PROs. 
A limited change 
By combining these data with those on public pro-
ject funding presented in the next section, we can 
map the flows of public funding in France as in  
Figure 3. This figure supports quantitatively the tra-
ditional view of the French research system, where 
public research is strongly concentrated in PROs and 
essentially funded through core funding, while pro-
ject funding is specialised towards support to the 
private sector. 
Moreover, change in the last few decades has 
been rather moderated: thus, the share of project 
funding has nearly doubled from 11% in 1982 to 
21% in 2002, but this is essentially a result of the in-
crease of funds to private companies, and funding of 
international programmes. At the same time, the 
share of higher education in core public funding has 
increased from 15% to 32%, but this has not sub-
verted the place of PROs, which still receive two-
thirds of core funds. 
Level of public project funding and its evolution 
Public project funding is a reference to non-core 
funding allocated through specific instruments  
directly to individual researchers or research units. 
Two main criteria help to distinguish between insti-
tutional and project funding. First funding must be 
limited in scope, budget and time. Second, the bene-
ficiary must not be institutionally attached to the 
granting institution. In most cases, this leads to the 
existence of dedicated institutions (agencies, acad-
emies or councils) external to the central administra-
tion, but this is not systematic as demonstrated by 
Italy. 
To apply the methodology developed by Lepori et 
al (2006), a detailed analysis of all funding channels 
described by the official budgetary documents (the 
so-called jaunes for research and higher education) 
was undertaken for 2002 and then retrospectively 
over a period of 20 years. We note that these data do 
not include funding from regions, which we believe 
has become much more important since the begin-
ning of the decentralisation process (1984), because 
there are currently no aggregated data available. 
Moreover, we need to be careful in the discussion 
regarding the year 1982 since the large technological 
programmes were still active and were not consid-
ered among project funding. 
The aggregation reached €3.11 billion spent in 
2002 on project funding, representing 21% of total 
public funding as compared with 29% for Austria, 
32% in Switzerland, 24% in Italy and 46% in Nor-
way (Lepori et al, 2008). Although this level is 
lower than other countries, the difference is less sig-
nificant than we anticipated. Moreover, we wit-
nessed a doubling of this share between 1982 and 
2002: the level of project funding has risen from 
Table 1. Main PRO staff in France, 2002 
EPST Staff EPIC Staff 
CNRS 26,550 CEA 11,857 
INRA 8,633 ONERA 1,725 
INSERM 5,162 CIRAD 1853 
IRD 1,654 IFREMER 1,375 
INRIA 992 BRGM 920 
Source: PLF (2002) 
State 
Private 
HE 
PRO 
Project 
funding 
Core 
funding 
21% 79% 
71% 
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68% 
 State 
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Project 
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11% 89% 
89% 
11% 85% 
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Figure 3.  Structure of public funding, 1982 and 2002 
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0.13% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1982 to 
0.18% in 1990 and to 0.20% in 2002 while, over the 
same period, total gross expenditure on R&D 
(GERD) has decreased from 1.07% of GDP in 1982 
to 0.85% of GDP in 2002 (OECD, 2005). 
The results (see Figure 4) highlight the import-
ance of non-French public sources of funding: the 
European Union (EU) Framework Programme (FP) 
and European Space Agency (ESA) account for 
nearly one-third of total project funding (32%). This 
was only 13% in 1982, and the core of the change 
took place in the 1980s, since, by 1990, this share 
had reached 29%. 
Moreover, the figures underline a low level of in-
termediation, since only 27% of total public funding 
goes through French intermediary agencies, with the 
agency in the space sector, CNES, and its national 
programmes accounting for 15% (see Figure 5). The 
other significant agency is ANVAR focusing on in-
novation in small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) accounting for 8%. The other agencies 
(ADEME for energy and environment technologies, 
ANRS for AIDS research, ANRT for CIFRE, a 
mechanism for PhD thesis jointly funded with indus-
try) account for 4%. 
Finally, most mechanisms in place in 2002 were 
directly managed by ministries, which represented 
41% of total project funding. Three ministries plaid 
a central role: Research and Defence with 17% and 
14% respectively and Industry with 8%. The share 
of Industry and Research Ministries nearly doubled 
over a 20-year period, while Defence, has witnessed 
a continuous decrease, first rather slow (from 35% in 
1982 to 30% in 1990), then accelerating to reach 
14% in 2000. Although the decrease is general in 
European countries, France is unique among large 
defence spenders for the significance of the reduction. 
We can thus conclude that, when applying  
the project funding methodology, France has a  
lower rate of project funding than other European 
countries. However, its share has almost doubled 
over 20 years despite the reduction in defence fund-
ing. This is mainly because of the growing Europ-
eanisation of French research, European sources 
being multiplied by 2.3 over the same period of time 
and now accounting for one-third of total project 
funding. Second, compared to other countries, pro-
ject funding is overwhelmingly directed towards in-
dustry: 70% goes to the private sector, a figure 
intermediary
27%
national 
41% 
international 
32% 
Figure 4.  Project funding in France, 2002: aggregation by 
levels of management 
Notes:  International brings together ESA and FP 
Intermediary institutions combines CNES (national pro-
grammes), ANVAR (project development, personnel 
grants and other grants), ANRT (CIFRE), ANRS and 
ADEME 
National level consists of the Ministry of Defence (so 
called “amont” studies), the Ministry of Industry (with 
FSH, Eureka, key technologies, microelectronics, in-
formation technologies and ATOUT), the Ministry of 
Research (with FNS-ACI, FNS-Regions, FNS-young 
researchers, FRT-RRIT, FRT-Regions, FRT-
Innovation, doctoral grants and post-doctoral grants) 
and other smaller ministries (health with PHRC for 
clinical research, transportation, housing, employment)
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Figure 5.  Project funding in France: main trends, 1982, 1990, 2002 
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unique in Europe for public project funding when 
considering Italy (55%), Switzerland (19%), Austria 
(42%) or Norway (7%). 
When only considering the instruments clearly 
dedicated to academic research, we arrive at the very 
low amount of 14%, with half of it for PhD grants, 
and only 4% for disciplinary-based calls, thus high-
lighting a missing dimension, namely funding of 
academic research through intermediary agencies, 
which in all the other countries considered except  
Italy represents a major component of public project 
funding. 
Joint laboratories and the new role of CNRS 
Can we be satisfied with this description and simply 
conclude that France does it its own way and that lit-
tle has changed during the last few decades? 
We believe that this conclusion overlooks the  
important changes that occurred in the last three 
decades in the organisation and funding of public re-
search through the generalisation of the joint labora-
tories between PROs and universities and the 
introduction of the labelling process as a way to ac-
cess to resources. We propose that these mecha-
nisms are largely similar to project-based processes: 
a periodic open call, a strong selection process, and 
support limited in time and scope. Through it, CNRS 
allocates different resources: funds, access to large 
facilities and, primarily, human resources. This latter 
dimension has driven us to speak of an agency for 
“project-based” allocation of human resources. 
In doing so, we translate into figures a lasting  
on-going debate both within the academic sphere 
(Larédo and Mustar, 2001; d’Iribarne, 1999) and 
within research-management circles (see, for in-
stance, Mégie and Larrouturou, 2004). Its importance 
for French research policy is obvious, given the size 
and the importance of the CNRS in the system. 
While this section focuses on CNRS, the reader 
should be aware that this approach is not unique, since 
INSERM for medical research has also generalised it, 
and other research institutions such as INRA and 
IFREMER have also been active in this respect. 
We proceed as follows. First, we briefly explain 
the organisation of joint laboratories, the labelling 
mechanism and its implications for the allocation of 
resources. Further, we discuss the differences and 
similarities in project funding and, finally, we pro-
pose a new description of public research funding in 
France that better takes into account the specificities 
of this allocation mechanisms. 
Mixed research units 
A mixed research unit (the official terminology since 
1982) a joint laboratory involving more than one in-
stitution, typically a university and CNRS. This org-
anisation model was introduced in the 1970s to 
support university research and promote partnerships 
in the research system. Typically the laboratory 
comprises personnel funded by both organisations, 
has two budgets and two different affiliations. As we 
explain below, recognition of joint labs by CNRS is 
ruled by a specific labelling process managed by the 
CNRS scientific directorate. This is a competitive 
process with important entry and exit processes. 
The balance over time between university and 
CNRS staff has changed drastically, if only because 
the 1990s witnessed the creation of 12 new univer-
sity positions for each new position in PROs. In 
1998, the average joint lab had 49 staff, of which 13 
were university enseignants-chercheurs, nine were 
CNRS researchers, the other staff were doctoral and 
post-doctoral students and support staff (Larédo and 
Mustar, 2001). Furthermore, 50% of the mixed re-
search units were managed by teacher–researchers 
from the university in 2002 (CNRS, 2002). This 
situation enhances the mixed nature of the laborato-
ries since the management responsibility of the units 
is shared between CNRS researchers and university 
researchers. It is then the granted labels that create 
the perimeter of the CNRS, and the result is a mov-
ing border for the organisation. 
This situation means that CNRS should not be 
compared to research institutions like the Max 
Planck Gesellschaft, which has only its own labs 
with its own staff. Thus, including CNRS joint labo-
ratories under the PRO category can lead to mislead-
ing comparisons across countries. Joint laboratories 
do not fit into the distinction between higher educa-
tion and PROs and should be considered as distinct 
organisational forms across these two sectors. 
The need to revise the categories for the analysis 
of public funding is shown by the relevance of this 
organisational arrangement in the French case, 
which makes it impossible to consider it as an ex-
ception. Today, more than 90% of CNRS research-
ers and around 80% of its technical staff work in 
joint and other associated labs on university cam-
puses, while the 1,000 joint research units constitute 
nearly 30% of all research units in universities (and 
almost all the most reputed ones; own calculations 
on CRNS, 2002). 
The question now arises as to how their funding 
from CNRS should be interpreted. To this end, we 
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examine in the next section the labelling process and 
its implications for the allocation of resources. 
Labelling process of joint research units 
Joint research units between CNRS and higher-
education institutions are the result of an overall  
labelling process of university research. 
Since 1988, universities have entered into a four-
year contract with the Ministry in charge of higher 
education, covering both their teaching and research 
activities. For university, this periodic contracting 
has turned into a major strategic event, since it  
delivers the accreditations for teaching curricula, de-
fines an envelope for investment and new positions, 
and allocates research money to recognised labs. 
Until 2006, labelling activities and resource alloca-
tions were undertaken by the same ministry service. 
The new law voted in 2006 has established a separa-
tion between evaluation/accreditation and allocation 
of funds, but it remains to be seen what actual 
changes this will lead to. 
Previously, research units already ‘associated’ 
with CNRS and those that were candidates for a new 
‘association’ were evaluated by the PRO process, 
the Ministry taking into account the results arrived 
at, and, from time to time, complementing the means 
allocated by the PRO. The open nature of this pro-
cess had the result of strongly increasing the number 
of associated labs, since many university labs ap-
plied for association to access CNRS resources. 
The 1,000 CNRS joint research units and new 
candidate units, thus follow the labelling process of 
CNRS. To explain it requires entering into organisa-
tional aspects of CNRS. CNRS is organised in seven 
scientific directorates, which cover broad fields of 
research (physics, chemistry, life sciences, engineer-
ing, social sciences and humanities, universe sci-
ences, mathematics). They are responsible for the 
labelling of units and the allocation of human and  
financial resources. 
For the evaluation, they have the support of the 
Comité National de la Recherche Scientifique 
(which also uses the CNRS acronym) that is made 
up of 40 disciplinary sections composed of both 
elected and nominated members, complemented by a 
few ad hoc inter-disciplinary sections. The Comité 
National is in charge of the recruitment and career of 
researchers. The choices made in its sections are 
largely followed by the Scientific and the General 
Directorates. 
The situation is not so clear-cut for research units. 
In most directorates, the evaluation is based on a vis-
iting committee in charge of reviewing both past ac-
tivities and the four-year project proposed by the 
unit. Its members are nominated by the scientific di-
rectorate, while the sections of the Comité National 
concerned with the unit nominate one member to the 
panel. They are the guarantors that quality issues  
and research excellence are well addressed. The sec-
tions also review the reports prepared by visiting 
committees adding their own advice about proposed 
directions. 
Decisions about labelling, renewal, closure and 
transformation are made by the scientific directorates. 
Decisions translate into the nomination of a  
director with a letter of mission. They are accom-
panied by the allocation of resources: human, tech-
nical (new equipment or access to large facilities) 
and, to a lesser extent, financial. CNRS considers 
that the label granted gives a privileged access to 
other external resources and that it is the responsibil-
ity of units to find the majority of additional funds 
needed. 
There has been no extensive account of the 
level of renewal and transformation of research 
units. D’Iribarne (1999) suggested a 10% turnover 
over a four-year period. This is below the level 
presented by Larédo (1997) for INSERM, which 
has a somewhat similar mechanism. In any case, 
analysts converge on two points. First, at least 
one-third of units disappear or change drastically 
over one decade, a period considered as corres-
ponding to the life cycle of an approach in most 
fields, and at least another third have significant 
internal changes with new team structures, new 
themes and/or changing balance of themes. Sec-
ond, there is a strong push for merging units so as 
to build critical size units. 
Towards a new approach to resource allocation 
How can we evaluate the impact of such a mecha-
nism? Once more, analytical review of practice leads 
to a complex view of its effects. 
First, the process of staff allocation is both direct 
and indirect. Direct since the label is allocated on the 
basis of staff already in the lab (or ready to move on 
a voluntary basis). Indirect because it is seldom the 
case that new positions (both for researchers and 
technicians) are attached to the label granted. Yet we 
can suppose that allocations that are the remit of the 
Scientific Directorates take the recognised needs 
into account. 
Another important dimension lies in staff mobility. 
The staff can move within CNRS and, in particular, 
between CNRS research units. Theoretically at least, 
labs have thus to devise strategies to become attrac-
tive for other CNRS researchers to increase their own 
research capability. Thus, the label gives access to an 
important internal market of researchers, since it sig-
nals labs open for CNRS researchers. 
Second, the label gives access to shared resources, 
and especially to large facilities, both CNRS ones 
and others through the collaborations and alliances 
that CNRS has developed. These resources can be 
area specific (such as large telescopes or synchro-
trons) or generic (such as computing capacity or ac-
cess to large databases). 
Third, along with the label come direct financial 
allocations, which amount to €300 million annually 
(CNRS, 2002). This is complemented with other  
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targeted procedures (for young teams within re-
search units, for given themes) that are only accessi-
ble to CNRS units. 
Thus, we can assume that, at the macro level, 
there is a strong correlation between the labelling 
and the resources that the joint research units mobi-
lise from CNRS. Moreover, labelling is in principle 
an open and competitive process, which new labora-
tories can also try to access and for which resources 
are granted only for a limited period of time. Finally, 
as explained previously, joint laboratories are at 
least partially external to CNRS. As a consequence, 
we propose to design a different allocation structure 
of public funding in France in which we introduce a 
“human resources allocation” of CNRS to joint labo-
ratories as in Figure 6; its positioning to the right 
side of the picture shows our interpretation that this 
mechanism is more similar to project funding than to 
core funding. 
French ‘specificity’ revised 
To assess the impact of the proposed change, we 
propose a conservative measure, including only the 
CNRS (and not resources allocated by other PROs 
following in some cases the same process), and 
within CNRS only state resources directly targeted 
to joint research units. We thus consider the total 
amount of support granted to joint units in 2002 
(€307 million), plus the share of CNRS staff in joint 
research units, thus another €1316 million (CNRS, 
2002). This amount increases the total project-based 
allocation by 52%, bringing it to €4.7 billion and 
31% of the total public spending, a share similar to 
Switzerland, and well above Austria (26%). This 
demonstrates that the point lies not only in the speci-
ficities of the instrument, but also in its quantitative 
importance in the French context. 
A second major change deals with the roles of  
recipients. Public research becomes the main benefi-
ciary of project funding with 54% (compared to 29% 
in the previous description), while this allocation is 
nearly equally shared between usual financial sup-
port (including CNRS support to joint research 
units) and the human resource allocation process. 
The third change deals with the share of academi-
cally focused support. With this new definition of 
project-based support, the share of resources chan-
nelled through mechanisms focusing on academic 
research is tripled and represents 43% of the total. 
This is more in line with the other countries consid-
ered in the study. 
Thus, the three conclusions put forward in the 
previous analysis no longer hold. First, intermedia-
ting structures are now the major source of funding 
with 52% of total project-based funding (see Figure 
7). In relative terms, with over one-third of total pro-
ject-based resource allocation, CNRS compares  
favourably with most grant-allocating agencies or 
councils. Central state sources dwindle to a standard 
quarter of total project-based funding, while Euro-
pean sources stand at one-fifth. 
Joint laboratories 
State 
PRO  
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A step towards the continental European model? 
A further significant change, both for its practical 
and symbolic implications, has been the creation in 
2005 of the Agence Nationale de la Recherche 
(ANR), as a specialised project funding agency 
mostly devoted to funding public laboratories and 
academic research. Structurally, the creation of the 
ANR has been the combining of the former FNS 
(Fonds National de la Science) and FRT (Fonds pour 
la Recherche Technologique). However, this aggre-
gation has reinforced the new agency, whose budget 
has been strongly increased in the last two years: 
with €800 million, the ANR budget for 2006 was 
about half the CNRS allocation to joint laboratories. 
As Figure 8 shows, despite the creation of the 
ANR, public labs still largely depend on CNRS re-
sources, but the shift in the composition of project 
funding between 2002 and 2006 has been signifi-
cant. Additional resources are now engaged prefer-
entially in the new agency and this might lead in the 
long run to a fundamental change in the system if 
this policy orientation lasts for some years. In fact, 
the 2010 objective of the ANR is to finance research 
projects in academic labs at the level reached by all 
the EPST together (Audier, 2006). 
While in organisational terms the creation of the 
ANR represents a fundamental innovation, in terms 
of the funding schemes (and of the related ration-
ales) it has been largely the continuation of a long-
term trajectory. The creation of the joint labs and of 
the labelling mechanism already introduced into the 
French context the concept and the model of the 
competitive allocation of resources, and the related 
practices of fund-seeking at the lab level. 
However, the role of CNRS and the articulation 
between the PRO function and the funding agency 
function were highly debated, while a recent pro-
posal for reform pointed to strengthening the core of 
its own labs as the central mission of the organisa-
tion (Mégie and Larrouturou, 2004). Once the main 
ideas of the new funding rationale were introduced 
in the political discussion, the path to creating a 
separate funding agency in the face of the CNRS re-
sistance to change was open, but this did not require 
the existing organisation to be disrupted (with the in-
tention, however, that the new agency could become 
dominant in a few years). 
Discussion and conclusions 
Besides its interest as the presentation of a specific 
case of national funding model for research, this 
analysis leads to some relevant conclusions concern-
ing the study of public funding and the use of quan-
titative indicators for it, as well as on the changes in 
research funding and research systems. 
In methodological terms, this analysis shows the 
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In methodological terms, this analysis 
shows the problem of the choice of the 
underlying categories in the 
production of indicators: specifically, 
comparative analysis over long periods 
of time requires the adoption of stable 
categories 
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unavoidable question of the choice of the underlying 
categories in the production of indicators. Specifi-
cally, comparative analysis over long periods of time 
requires the adoption of stable categories: in this  
respect, the simple categorisation of funding be-
tween core and project funding and of public re-
search systems between PROs, higher-education 
institutions and private companies has proved ex-
tremely powerful (Lepori et al, 2007, this issue). The 
success of the project funding exercise rests largely 
on these simplifications and on the demonstration 
that borderline cases were sufficiently limited not to 
alter the results fundamentally. 
However, the French case demonstrates that these 
categories should never be used blindly in a new 
case without critically questioning their applicabil-
ity; both joint laboratories and labelling did not quite 
fit into the original classification scheme and thus 
we resorted to introducing new categories specific to 
France. 
Moreover, it appears clear from our discussion 
that the definition of the categories and the decision 
as to where to classify individual items is essentially 
a matter of interpretation and thus is basically ques-
tionable. The whole discussion on human resources 
funding displays clearly how these classifications 
can be subject to debate. 
Finally, this case displays the whole problem of 
using categories to analyse the evolution over time, 
where changes are in many cases gradual. Thus it 
can be very difficult to decide when to reclassify an 
instrument or an organisation and mixed forms can 
arise in some periods of time; this entails the risks 
that changes over time are hidden by the use of old 
instruments to analyse reality. 
To what extent does this methodological exercise 
lead to a different interpretation of the French case 
and of its specificity? Not surprisingly, the answer is 
ambiguous and open to debate. First, it is clear that 
the stylised view of a public research system domi-
nated by PROs directly funded by the state no longer 
holds and that the system has been profoundly modi-
fied by the reforms of the last three decades. At the 
same time, the differences with most European 
countries, where public research is based on the uni-
versities and funded by a mix of core and project 
funding, are still quite evident. 
We face as proposed by OECD (2003) a hybrid 
model, where a new type of agency and intermedia-
tion has emerged and transformed traditional re-
search institutions into ‘human resource’ granting 
agencies serving a system now overwhelmingly 
made up of university-based research. More pre-
cisely, this allocation system should be considered 
hybrid in two respects: because joint laboratories are 
halfway between CNRS’s own laboratories and uni-
versity laboratories; and because the labelling 
mechanism contains competitive elements character-
istic of project funding, but the results of the compe-
tition are only indirectly translated in allocation of 
resources and, also, these resources are in the form 
of scientific personnel in a pool controlled by the 
CNRS, rather than as a free monetary allowance. We 
must not forget that, since CNRS researchers have 
civil servant status, they have considerable freedom 
of choice as to which laboratory to work in and 
whether to move or not; thus allocation of resources 
is linked to the willingness of personnel to move. 
This hybrid nature has been widely acknowledged 
in the public debate and has raised highly discussed 
issues about the mission and organisation of the 
CNRS itself, which seems to have lost its identity as 
a PRO without finding a new position in the French 
system. Thus, a document prepared by a former 
CNRS directorate calls for a clearer distinction be-
tween the PRO function, with a strong reduction of 
the number of the laboratories, and the funding 
agency function, which should be open to all public 
laboratories (Mégie and Larrouturou, 2004). 
The whole discussion should also be considered 
in the framework of the emergence of the French 
universities as central actors in research policy and 
thus the fact that the joint laboratories are now  
embedded in an institutional context where their 
hosting universities increasingly attempt to develop 
their own research strategies. This represents a dra-
matic change with respect to the anomic universities 
of the 1970s and 1980s (Musselin, 2001) and tends 
to modify the position of the joint laboratories and 
the relative strength of both parties. 
However, what is not clear now is whether this 
hybrid model represents a stable and specific con-
figuration to France, or whether it should be consid-
ered as an evolutionary step towards the European 
standard model, as the recent creation of a large 
funding agency might indicate. 
For the analysis of the evolution of research poli-
cies, and of institutional change in general, this 
study also engenders a number of remarks. A first 
lesson concerns the possibility of profoundly chang-
ing a system without disrupting it, while in organisa-
tional studies the model of stable institutional 
configurations alternated with periods of profound 
institutional change is considered more relevant. 
This gradual evolution depended critically on the 
possibility of incoherencies in the institutional set-
ting, the whole ambiguity over the mission of the 
CNRS being a case in point. 
Moreover, this process entailed a good deal of 
clever political design to avoid being stuck in block-
ing situations; a good example has been introducing 
competition among labs for resources, while at the 
same time granting job security to CNRS researchers 
through the civil servant status. Introducing major 
institutional changes as additions to the existing sys-
tems and then using the selecting attribution of re-
sources across time to let them grow was also a 
strategy followed in many cases. 
A second lesson is the strength of the organisation 
model based on higher-education institutions and a 
mix of core and project funding: this international 
model functioned throughout the whole period as a 
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conceptual reference for policy-makers, emphasising 
the French specificity as a weakness, and thus 
granted some stability to the reform. This strength is 
crucially linked to the flexibility, which allowed the 
translation of the model to organisational forms 
suited to the French context (considering the CNRS 
as a funding agency involved a considerable reinter-
pretation of the original concept). 
Finally, the French case appears as an interesting 
case of path dependency (Lepori et al, 2007, this is-
sue). It is composed of a number of successive 
events, whose sequential dependencies are retro-
spectively evident: for example, the introduction of 
the labelling process led to the transition towards a 
project-funding model only because it took place af-
ter the generalisation of the joint labs; otherwise, it 
would have meant just introducing a competitive 
means of steering CNRS internal labs. This path was 
not designed from the beginning and depended criti-
cally on other events, such as the emergence of uni-
versities as relevant actors in the French system. We 
could speak of the inevitability of the European 
model, but at least we can say, from a careful analy-
sis of historical events, that this process has been far 
from simple and determined in advance and other 
outcomes would have been possible. 
 
Notes 
1. In 2002, it was called Ministère de l’Éducation Nationale, de 
l’Enseignement Supérieur et de la Recherche. The reader is 
reminded that terminologies of departments change quite often 
in France, even if the corresponding administrations remain 
untouched. 
2. In 2002, it was no longer a full ministry but a subordinate one to 
the Ministry of Education, covering higher education and re-
search. However, it still had a delegated Minister in charge of it. 
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